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Abstract.With the increase in the number of electronic services and the number 
of users, concerns about the privacy protection of electronic data are growing 
day by day.  Organisations are facing a huge pressure to assure their users about 
the privacy protection of their personal data. Organisations need to include the 
privacy policies of their users when deciding who should access their personal 
data. The user’s privacy policy will need to be combined with the 
organisation’s own policy, as well as policies from different authorities such as 
the issuer of the data, and the law. The authorisation system will need to ensure 
the enforcement of all these policies. We have designed a system that will 
ensure the enforcement of multiple privacy policies within an organisation and 
throughout a distributed system.  
Keywords: Privacy Policy, AIPEP, Master PDP, Conflict Resolution, Sticky 
Policy. 
1   Introduction 
Many web sites today collect PII (Personal Identity Information) such as name and 
address from users through online registration, surveys, user profiles, and online order 
fulfilment processes etc. Also different personal data such as educational record, 
health data, credit card information and so on are collected by different organisations 
in order to provide consumers with services. An example of such service is an online 
job agency where people post their CV in order to get the opportunity to hunt for jobs 
worldwide. Once released, users lose control over the fate of their personal data. But 
personal data items like CVs which contain sensitive personal information may invite 
not only job offers but also unwanted ID theft. Losing PII has serious consequences 
from significant financial loss to becoming a suspect of a worldwide crime which is 
committed with stolen ID. It is not uncommon for someone to get arrested due to a 
crime committed by an identity thief using that person’s ID [1]. In the UK, the 
number of ID thefts is an alarming 19.86% higher in the first quarter of 2010 [2] 
compared with the same period in 2009. About 27,000 victims were recorded by 
CIFAS member during the first 3 months of 2010 [2]. As a consequence concerns for 
the privacy of electronic private data are also rising day by day [3, 4].  Hence the 
necessity for more technical control over personal data collected online in order for 
users to gain more confidence and trust about the use of their personal data. Technical 
controls will also help to protect personal data from being misused and as well as 
enforce privacy laws so that personal data loss from reputed organisations like HSBC 
bank [5] or Zurich Insurance [6] may be avoided.       
 Policy based systems are now well established [7, 8]. They rely on an application 
independent policy decision point (PDP) to make authorization decisions, and an 
application dependent policy enforcement point (PEP) to enforce these decisions. The 
model assumes that all the policies are written in the same language and are evaluated 
by a single PDP. However in a federated identity management system we cannot 
assume that every service provider (SP) and identity provider (IdP) will use the same 
policy language for specifying their rules. This is because different policy languages 
support different rule sets and hence support different requirements. Today we have 
many examples of different policy languages e.g. XACMLv2 [9], XACMLv3 [10], 
PERMIS [11], P3P [12], Keynote [13] etc. and even more PDP implementations. 
Differences between languages are for example that XACMLv2 does not support 
delegation of authority whilst XACMLv3 and PERMIS do. The XACML policy 
language assumes a stateless PDP hence cannot support state based policy rules such 
as separation of duties (SoD), whilst PERMIS is state based and can support both 
dynamic and static SoD. No version of XACML supports credentials (the concept is 
simply not mentioned in the standard), whereas Keynote does and uses the same 
language to describe both credentials and policy rules. PERMIS also supports 
credentials and has a credential validation service [14].  P3P is designed specifically 
to express privacy policies, whereas the others were designed as access control or 
authorization policy languages. It is simply not possible to construct policies that 
satisfy every requirement using a single policy language or PDP. Therefore we need 
an infrastructure that can support multiple PDPs and multiple policy languages.  
Obligations are actions that must be performed when a certain event occurs. 
When the event is an authorization decision, then the obligations are actions that must 
accompany this decision. Some obligations need to be performed before the decision 
is enforced, some after the decision has been enforced, and some along with the 
enforcement of the authorization decision [15]. We propose an obligations service 
with a standard interface that can be called from multiple places in an application, 
with one of these places being the application independent authorization 
infrastructure. 
Private data should be protected by the policy of its owner.  We have used the 
sticky policy paradigm [16] to ensure that the private data is stuck with the policy not 
only within the system but also while leaving the system. In attribute based access 
control (ABAC), the PDP makes its decisions based on the attributes of the subject, 
requested action, resource and environment. We propose a credential validation 
service (CVS) [14] that is responsible for validating subject credentials, extracting the 
valid attributes from them and discarding the rest.  
Finally, we need to keep authorisation decision making as simple as possible for 
application developers. The complexity should be hidden behind a standard interface 
and orchestration of the different authorisation components should be done by the 
infrastructure itself. We propose an application independent PEP (AIPEP) for this.  
In this paper we propose an advanced multi-policy authorization infrastructure 
that will provide privacy of personal data. The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 reviews related research. Section 3 discusses the architecture and 
components of the proposed system. Section 4 discusses the Sticky Policy 
implementation strategy and Section 5 describes the conflict resolution policy. Some 
use case scenarios are provided in Section 6. Details of our implementation to date are 
provided in Section 7 and finally Section 8 concludes by discussing our future plans. 
2   Related Research  
IBM’s security research group has performed research on privacy protection of 
customer's data collected by enterprises [17-21]. They used the sticky policy 
paradigm where personal data is associated with its privacy policy and they are passed 
together when exchanging data among enterprises [17-19,21]. But they did not 
provide a way to accommodate different policy languages. Also the obligations they 
are providing are just activity names such as ‘log’, ‘notify’, ‘getConsent’ etc. [8]. 
They also did not provide a way to actually enforce the obligation which our system 
does.  
HP [22, 23] have also been working on providing privacy to PII by enforcing 
obligations.  They have also provided a way of transmitting encrypted confidential 
data with obligations to other parties by obfuscation of the data [22]. Nevertheless, the 
work has only described obligations related to privacy and does not provide a uniform 
solution to both access control and privacy. Their work does not consider policies 
from different authorities nor does it integrate multiple policy languages.  
Qun Ni et al [24, 25] have defined the privacy related access control model P-
RBAC to support privacy related policies. This model theoretically associates data 
permissions with purposes, conditions and obligations. However, the model is too 
complex to be implemented practically.  
While private data can move between organizations with its sticky privacy policy, 
the enforcement of the privacy policy is only ensured if either all the organizations 
support the same policy language, which is not feasible in practice, or the 
organizations have support for multiple policy languages. Our model supports 
multiple policy languages as well as policies from different authorities.  
It has been claimed [26, 27] that the privacy policy defined by the owner of data 
should have the highest priority. But the fact is that the Law should have the highest 
priority. No one should be able to break the Law.  No other previous work has 
focused on this issue. In our system we have implemented the Law PDP by 
converting the legal requirements into an XACML policy and this Law PDP is always 
given the highest priority. For example if there is a court order for seeing someone’s 
personal data neither the person nor the data controller can deny access to the data. To 
the best of our knowledge, no previous work has been concerned with integrating the 
policies of the law, data subject or data controller which is done by our system.   
3  The Authorisation System  
In order to satisfy the various requirements presented above we introduce several new 
components into the privacy preserving advanced authorization infrastructure. 
Firstly we introduce an application independent policy enforcement point, the 
AIPEP. The AIPEP is responsible for coordinating the actions of the various 
components of the application independent authorization infrastructure. When the 
AIPEP receives either an authorization decision query message (step 1 in figure 1), it 
first calls the CVS to validate any credentials that are contained in the message (step 2 
in figure 1). If the message contains a sticky policy/ies (see figure 2) then this/these 
will be stored in the policy store. The AIPEP retains a manifest which records which 
CVSs and PDPs are currently spawned and which policies each is configured with. 
The AIPEP tells the Master PDP which set of spawned PDPs to use for a particular 
authorization decision request.  
The Credential Validation Service (CVS) is the component that validates 
credentials by checking that each credential issuer is mentioned in the credential 
validation policy directly, or that the credential issuer has been delegated a privilege 
by a trusted Attribute Authority (AA) either directly or indirectly (i.e. a chain of 
trusted issuers is dynamically established controlled by the Delegation Policies of the 
Source of Authority and the intermediate AAs in the chain). The Credential 
Validation Policy, written by the SOA, contains rules that govern which attributes 
different AAs are trusted to issue to which user group, along with a Delegation Policy 
for each AA.  
In order to evaluate multiple authorization policies in different languages we 
introduce a new conceptual component called the Master PDP. The Master PDP is 
responsible for calling multiple PDPs (step 7) as directed by the AIPEP, obtaining 
their authorization decisions (step 8), and then resolving any conflicts between these 
decisions, before returning the overall authorization decision and any resulting 
obligations to the AIPEP (in step 9). Each of the policy PDPs supports the same 
interface, which is the SAML profile of XACML. This allows the Master PDP to call 
any number of subordinate PDPs, each configured with its own policy in its own 
language.  This design isolates the used policy languages from the rest of the 
authorization infrastructure, and the Master PDP will not be affected by any changes 
to any policy language as it evolves or by the introduction of any new policy 
language. Of course, new policy languages will require new PDPs to be written to 
interpret them, and these new PDPs will require new code in the PDP/CVS factory 
object so that it knows how to spawn them on demand. But this is a one-off 
occurrence for each new policy language and PDP that needs to be supported by the 
infrastructure. 
The policy store is the location where policies can be safely stored and retrieved. 
If the store is trusted then policies can be stored there in an unsecured manner. If the 
store is not trustworthy then policies will need to be protected e.g. digitally signed 
and/or encrypted, to ensure that they are not tampered with and/or remain 
confidential. When the AIPEP stores a policy in the policy store, it provides the store 
with the StickyPolicy element, see Figure 2, and is returned a locally unique storage 
reference to the policy, called the policy store handle (PSH). The AIPEP can 
subsequently use this handle to pass the policy to the PDP/CVS factory in order to 
spawn a new PDP or CVS. This design cleanly separates the implementation details 
of the policy store from the rest of the infrastructure, and allows different types of 
policy store to be constructed e.g. built on an LDAP directory or RDBMS. 
Fig. 1. The privacy preserving advanced authorization system
Obligations may be required before the user’s action is performed, after the user’s 
action has been performed, or simultaneously with the performance of the user’s 
action [15]. We call this the temporal type of the obligation. Examples are as follows: 
before the user is given access get the consent of owner; after the user has been given 
access, email the data owner that his/her data is accessed; simultaneously with the 
user’s access, write on the log the activities he/she is doing.  
According to the XACML model, each obligation has a unique ID (a URI). We 
follow this scheme in our infrastructure. Each obligations service is configured at 
construction time with the obligation IDs it can enforce and the obligation handling 
services that are responsible for enacting them. It is also configured with the temporal 
type(s) of the obligations it is to enforce. When passed a set of obligations by the 
AIPEP, the obligations service will walk through this set, ignore any obligations of 
the wrong temporal type or unknown ID, and call the appropriate obligation handling 
service for the others. If any single obligation handling service returns an error, then 
the obligations service stops further processing and returns an error to the AIPEP. If 
all obligations are processed successfully, a success result is returned. Each of the 
obligations enforced by the AIPEP must be of temporal type before. The Ontology 
Mapping Server is a service which returns the relationship between two different 
terms. The ontology is held as a lattice, and the server will say if one term dominates 
the other in the lattice or if there is no domination relationship between them.    The 
Master PDP will call this server to determine the relationship of the subjects / roles of 
PDP rule so that the specificOverrides DCR (see later) can be implemented. 
<xs:element name="StickyPad" type="StickyPADType"/> 
<xs:complexType name="StickyPADType"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
        <xs:element ref="DataResource"/> 
        <xs:element name="DataResourceTypes" type="ResourceTypes"/> 
        <xs:element ref="StickyPolicy" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
        <xs:element ref="ds:Signature" minOccurs="0"/> 
    </xs:sequence>     
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:complexType name="ResourceTypes"> 
   <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="ResourceType" type="xs:anyURI" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>        
   </xs:sequence>     
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:element name="StickyPolicy" type="StickyPolicyType"/> 
<xs:complexType name="StickyPolicyType"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
        <xs:element name="PolicyAuthor" type="saml:NameIDType"/> 
        <xs:element name="PolicyResourceTypes" type="ResourceTypes" /> 
        <xs:element ref="PolicyContents"/>               
    </xs:sequence> 
    <xs:attribute name="PolicyID" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> 
    <xs:attribute name="PolicyLanguage" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> 
    <xs:attribute name="PolicyType" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/> 
    <xs:attribute name="TimeOfCreation" type="xs:dateTime" use="required"/> 
    <xs:attribute name="ExpiryTime" type="xs:dateTime" use="optional"/> 
</xs:complexType> 
    <xs:element name="PolicyContents" type="AnyXMLType"/> 
<xs:element name="DataResource" type="AnyXMLType"/> 
<xs:complexType name="AnyXMLType" mixed="true"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
        <xs:any minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded" namespace="##any" 
processContents="lax"> 
            <xs:annotation> 
                <xs:documentation> 
                    Any xml content is allowed in this element. 
                </xs:documentation> 
            </xs:annotation> 
        </xs:any> 
    </xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:schema> 
Fig. 2. Sticky Policy and StickyPAD Schema
4   Sticky Policy Implementation  
Figure 2 provides a schema for sticky policies.  A sticky policy comprises: 
- The policy author i.e. the authority which wrote the policy. 
- The globally unique policy ID 
- The time of creation of the policy and optional expiry time. 
- The type(s) of resource(s) that are covered by this policy. 
- The type of policy this is (see Figure 3). 
- The policy language. 
- The policy itself, written in the specified policy language. 
Any number of sticky policies can be stuck to a data resource in either an 
application dependent manner e.g. as a <Condition> in a SAML attribute assertion, or 
by using the StickyPAD (sticky policy(ies) and data) XML structure that we have 
defined in Figure 2. The policies should be stuck to the data by using a digital 
signature. This could be by using the XML <ds:Signature> structure in the 
StickyPAD and SAML attribute assertion, or it could be externally provided e.g. by 
using SSL/TLS when transferring the data and policy across the Internet. It is the 
responsibility of the sending PEP to create the equivalent of the StickyPAD structure 
when sending data with a sticky policy attached, and the receiving PEP to validate its 
signature when it receives the message in step 0 of figure 1. The PEP should then 
parse and unpack the contents and pass the sticky policy to the AIPEP along with the 
authorization decision request (step 1 of figure 1). 
The sticky store holds the mapping between sticky policies and the resources to 
which they are stuck. This is a many to many mapping so that one policy can apply to 
many resources and one resource can have many sticky policies applied to it. The 
design requires that each policy has a globally unique Policy ID (PID) and each 
resource has a locally unique resource ID (RID). The PID was chosen to be globally 
unique for performance reasons, so that when a sticky policy is moved from system to 
system, the receiver can determine if it needs to analyse each received policy or not. 
Already known PIDs don’t need to be analysed, whereas unknown PIDs will need to 
be evaluated to ensure that they can be supported, otherwise the incoming data and 
sticky policy will need to be rejected. The RID is locally unique and may be 
constructed by applying a one way hash function such as SHA1 to the resource. We 
currently do not have a requirement to pass the RID from system to system so each 
system can compute its own. 
5   Conflict Resolution Policy 
Our system will include many different PDPs each with policies from different 
authorities and possibly written in different languages.  As a consequence a 
mechanism is needed to combine the decisions returned by these PDPs and resolve 
any conflicts between them. We propose a Master PDP which is the component 
responsible for combining the decision results returned by the subordinate PDPs and 
resolving the conflicts among their decisions.   
The Master PDP has a conflict resolution policy (CRP) consisting of multiple conflict 
resolution rules (CRRs). The default CRP is read in at program initialisation time and 
additional CRRs are dynamically obtained from the subjects’ and issuers’ sticky 
policies. Each conflict resolution rule (CRR) comprises:  
- a condition, which is tested against the request context by the Master PDP, to see if 
the attached decision combining rule should be used,  
- a decision combining rule (DCR),  
- optionally an ordering of policy authors (to be used by FirstApplicable DCR)  
- an author and  
- a time of creation.  
A DCR can take one of five values: FirstApplicable, DenyOverrides, GrantOverrides, 
SpecificOverrides or MajorityWins which applies to the decisions returned by the 
subordinate PDPs. The DCRs will be discussed shortly.  
The Master PDP is called by the AIPEP and is passed the list of PDPs to call and 
the request context. From the request context it will get the information such as 
requester, requested resource type, issuer and data subject of the requested resource. 
The Master PDP has all the CRRs defined by different authors as well as a default 
one. From the request context it knows the issuer and data subjects and so can 
determine the relevant CRRs. It will order the CRRs of law, issuer, data subject and 
holder sequentially. For the same author the CRRs will be ordered according to the 
number of conditions. For example the order of CRRs for a data subject can be  
CRR1= if (resourceType=PII, requester=myfriend, requestDate > 10.12.2010) DCR= 
DenyOverride 
CRR2=if (resourceType=PII, requester=myemployer) DCR=GrantOverride 
CRR3=if (resourceType=PII) DCR=MajorityWins 
Here the CRR with the most conditions will come first. All the conditions of a 
CRR need to match with the request context for it to be applicable. The CRR from the 
ordered CRR queue will be tested one by one against the request context. If the CRR 
conditions match the request context the CRR is chosen. If the CRR conditions do not 
match the request context the next CRR from the queue will be tested. The default 
CRR (which has DCR=DenyOverrides) will be placed at the end of CRR queue and it 
will only be reached when no other CRR conditions match the request context. The 
PDPs are called according to the DCR of the chosen CRR.  
Each PDP can return 5 different results –Grant, Deny, BTG, NotApplicable and 
Indeterminate. NotApplicable means that the PDP has no policy covering the 
authorisation request. Indeterminate means that the request context is either mal-
formed e.g. a String value is found in place of an Integer, or is missing some vital 
information so that the PDP does not currently know the answer. 
BTG (Break the Glass) [28] means that the requestor is currently not allowed 
access but can break the glass to gain access to the resource if he so wishes. In this 
case his activity will be monitored and he will be made accountable for his actions. 
BTG provides a facility for emergency access.  
If DCR=FirstApplicable the CRR is accompanied by a precedence rule 
(OrderOfAuthors) which says the order in which to call the PDPs. For example, if 
(resourceType=PII, requestor=data subject) DCR=FirstApplicable, 
OrderOfAuthor=law, dataSubject, holder. The Master PDP calls each subordinate 
PDP in order (according to the order of authors), and stops processing when the first 
Grant or Deny decision is obtained. 
For SpecificOverrides the decision returned by the PDP containing a rule with a 
more specific subject/ resource has priority over the PDP with a rule containing less 
specific subject/resource. As the master PDP does not have the rule the PDP needs to 
return the rule together with the decision in order to determine which PDP has the 
most specific subject/resource. The Master PDP will call the Ontology Mapping 
Server to determine which of the returned rules has the most specific subject first. If 
multiple PDP rules have the most specific subject the Master PDP will call the 
Ontology Mapping Server again to find the most specific resource among the rules 
having the most specific subjects. If multiple PDP rules have the same most specific 
subject and resource the decision of PDP with the latest creation time will be chosen. 
If any of the PDP does not return a rule but a decision only then it is not possible to 
implement SpecificOverrides as there is no way to determine whether the non rule 
returning PDP had the most specific subject or not. In that case a default rule (Deny 
Override) will be implemented as a fallback strategy.  
 For DenyOverrides and GrantOverrides the Master PDP will call all the 
subordinate PDPs and will combine the decisions using the following semantics:  
- DenyOverrides – A Deny result overrides all other results. The precedence of 
results for deny override is Deny>Indeterminate>BTG>Grant>NotApplicable. 
- GrantOverrides – A Grant result overrides all other results. The precedence of 
results for grant override is Grant>BTG>Indeterminate>Deny>NotApplicable 
When a final result returned by the Master PDP is Grant (or Deny) the obligations of 
all the PDPs returning a Grant (or Deny) result are merged to form the final 
obligation.  
For MajorityWins all the PDPs will be called and the final decision (Grant/Deny) 
will depend on the returned decision of majority number of PDPs. If the same 
numbers of PDP return Grant and Deny then Deny will be the final answer. If none of 
the PDP return Grant/Deny then Indeterminate will override NotApplicable.  
Initially the system will have the law and controller PDPs running as these two are 
common for all request contexts. Based on the request context the issuer and the data 
subject’s PDP may be started.  
6   Use Case Scenarios 
Mr K wants to get service from the X-Health Centre and for that he has to be 
registered at the X-Health Centre by authenticating himself with his ID. During the 
registration process he is also presented with a consent form where he indicates with 
whom he is prepared to share his medical data. This form includes tick boxes such as:  
1. Registered Dr/Consultant of other Organisation and a place where the name 
of the doctor can be written if it is known. If this box is ticked and no Dr’s 
name is specified then the consent will be for any Dr in general.  
2. Health Insurance Company (with a place for specifying the names of the 
company or can say all)  
3. Research organisation/ researcher. (A note will say that all the medical data 
used for research purpose will be anonymised or encoded.) 
4. Other organisations for promotional offers. Other organisations can for 
example be organisations offering samples and promotions for new born 
babies and their parents. In this case not all of the medical record will be 
available to the interested companies. It may be only the information that this 
person has recently become a parent. What portion of medical data will be 
available will be determined by the organisation’s policy. 
5. Other person (a place for specifying the name of the person.)  
Mr K has done registration with a Health Insurance Company (HIC1) to share his 
treatment cost. So he puts a tick on box 2 only and mentions HIC1 there and finishes 
his registration with X Health Centre.  
Here it is mentionable that the Health Insurance Company will not have access to all 
medical records of the patient. The policy of Health Centre will decide about what 
portion of the medical data is sufficient and available to Health Insurance Company.  
The HIC1 submits a request for the medical record of the data subject to the X-
Health Centre. The Master PDP of X-Health Centre’s authorisation system consults 
the CRRs of Law, issuer, data subject and holder sequentially. A law CRR says if 
resourceType=MedicalData then the DCR is DenyOverride. So this DCR is chosen 
and all the PDPs are consulted: 
 The law PDP returns decision N/A. 
 The issuer (health Centre) PDP returns decision N/A. 
 The data subject PDP returns decision grant. 
The final result is thus grant. The medical data is passed to HIC1 together with 
the policies from the data subject and the issuer. The issuer has two PDPs. One PDP 
has the internal access control rules such as only doctors are allowed to view the 
treatment files and doctors are not allowed to view the billing info and administrative 
persons are allowed to view the billing info only and no treatment info and another 
PDP says which external person are allowed to view the data such as the patient, 
doctors from another organisation so on. The PDP rules of data subject along with the 
issuer's PDP rules containing only the external rules are sent to HIC1. 
After receiving the medical data and PDP rules the receiving application will 
make a call to the authorisation system of HIC1 to see whether it can store the data. 
The authorisation system will reply grant with the obligation to start two new PDPs 
with the received policies and as a result the data is stored and the two new PDPs are 
started at HIC1's site, one for the data subject (Mr. K) and one for the issuer (X 
Health Centre). At HIC1's site the law and holder's (HIC1) PDPs already exist. 
HIC1 updates its records periodically and whenever the patient contacts it for 
clearing a payment. If the patient changes his PDP rules in the meantime by changing 
his preferences at the Health Centre the new policies are transferred to the HIC1 while 
transferring the data.  
Mr K did not allow researcher to view his medical record now. The researcher 
Mr R asks for medical record at the HIC1's system and is rejected by the data subject's 
PDP. 
Mr K now changes his rules at the site of X-Health Centre and ticks at the box 3 
to allow access to data by the researcher. Mr K’s PDP at the X-Health Centre is 
updated with the new rules saying researchers are allowed to view his medical data 
and there will be an “before” obligation added to it saying the data to be anonymised.   
When the HIC1 updates the data also gets the new PDP rules with it and updates the 
PDP rules at its site. If a researcher now asks for access at the HIC1’s site all other 
PDPs will return N/a and data subject's PDP will return grant with a “before” 
obligation to anonymise the data. This obligation will be passed to the Obligations 
Service of PEP. If this obligation can be enforced successfully a grant decision will be 
returned and the anonymised data will be passed to the researcher. If the obligation to 
anonymise the data can’t be enforced a deny decision will be returned to the 
researcher. It is mentionable that a researcher should be authenticated before granting 
access to the data. To be authenticated the researcher should have a “researcher” role 
provided by a trusted research organisation (eg. a University).  
7   Implementation Details  
Our advanced authorization infrastructure is implemented in Java, and is being used 
and developed as part of the EC TAS³ Integrated Project (www.tas3.eu). The first beta 
version is available for download from the PERMIS web site1. This contains the 
AIPEP, CVS, the Obligations Service, a stub Master PDP, a policy store, and multiple 
PDPs of different types.  
A number of different obligation handling services have been written that are 
called by the obligations service, and these can perform a variety of tasks such as 
write the authorization decision to a secure audit trail, send an email notification to a 
security officer, and update the internal state information (called retained ADI in 
ISO/IEC 10181-3 (1996)). We have implemented state based Break The Glass (BTG) 
policies [27] using the AIPEP, the obligations service and a stateless PDP. A live 
demo of BTG is available at http://issrg-testbed-2.cs.kent.ac.uk/. The performance of 
the obligation state handling BTG wrapper adds between 10% and 200% overhead to 
the performance of a stateless PDP that does not support BTG. The large overhead is 
caused because the stateless PDP has to be called more than once in some 
circumstances. A paper presenting the complete results is currently under preparation. 
We have constructed an ontology mapping server, which, when given two class 
names (such as Visa card and credit card) will return the relationship between them. 
The output says if either node is more specific than the other or if no such relationship 
exists between them. The Master PDP will call this ontology mapping server to 
determine the relationship of the subjects / roles of PDP rule so that specificOverrides 
DCR can be implemented.  
 The authorization infrastructure has been tested with three different PDPs: Sun’s 
XACML PDP2, the PERMIS PDP3 and a behavioral trust PDP from TU-Eindhoven4. 
Each of these PDPs uses a different policy language. Sun’s PDP uses the XACML 
1 Advanced authz software available from 
http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/permis/downloads/Level3/standalone.shtml 
2 Sun’s XACML PDP. Available from http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/. 
3 PERMIS PDP. Available from http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/permis 
4 TU-Eindhovens PDP. Available from 
http://w3.tue.nl/en/services/dpo/education_and_training/inleiding/pdp/ 
language, the PERMIS PDP uses its own XML based language whilst TU-
Eindhoven’s PDP uses SWI-Prolog.  The next step is to write a full Master PDP so 
that all these PDPs can be called together in parallel and their decisions resolved into 
one final decision using either a configured or dynamically pushed conflict resolution 
policy.   
8   Discussion, Conclusions and Future Plans  
Our authorization infrastructure does not obviate the need for trust. Our infrastructure 
still requires trust between the various parties. It is not a digital rights management 
(DRM) system that assumes the receiving party is untrustworthy and wants to steal 
any received information from the sender.  On the contrary, our infrastructure 
assumes that the various parties do trust each other to the extent that they want an 
automated infrastructure that can easily enforce each other’s policies reliably and 
automatically, and if it cannot, will inform the other party of the fact. Consequently 
data subjects must trust the organizations that they submit their PII to, so that when an 
organization says it will enforce a subject’s sticky policy, the subject can trust that it 
has every intention of doing so. Our system provides organizations with an 
application independent authorization infrastructure that makes it easy for them to 
enforce a subject’s privacy policy without having to write a significant amount of new 
code themselves. Furthermore the user has the potential for more complete control 
over his/her privacy than now, in that the infrastructure allows the user to specify a 
complete privacy policy including a set of obligations which can notify the user when 
his/her data is accessed or transferred between organizations e.g. by using an after 
obligation when giving permission for the transfer of her PII to go ahead or a before
obligation before giving permission for the PII to be read. However we expect the 
user interfaces for such full privacy policy creation to be too complex for most users 
to handle, and consequently organizations are more likely to provide their users with a 
policy template and a limited subset of options and boxes to tick, making the user’s 
task much easier. This also reduces the burden on the organization, since it won’t be 
sent user privacy policies that it cannot handle. The benefit of our infrastructure is that 
it does not constrain organizations in setting their privacy policy templates, as the 
infrastructure will enforce whatever combinations they choose.   
Organizations must also trust each other to honor the sticky policies that are passed 
to them when they transfer data between themselves. An untrustworthy organization 
can always discard any sticky policies it receives and never need access the 
authorization infrastructure to ask for permission to receive the data, but we assume 
that legally binding contracts between the organizations will require them to support 
any sticky policies that are transferred between them. Our authorization infrastructure 
makes it much easier for them to do this.  
Our final step is to implement the complete Master PDP and PDP/CV factory and 
then to perform user trials with two application demonstrators, one for the privacy 
protection and access to electronic medical records, the other for e-portfolios. Both of 
these applications require access to distributed personal information that is stored in a 
variety of repositories at different locations, and so a distributed sticky policy 
enforcement infrastructure is needed. 
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